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THE INTER VIVOS BRANCH OF THE WORTHIER
TITLE DOCTRINE
JOSEPH W. MORRIS *
Change for good reason is most appropriate. Sometimes it is superb, but
change for the sake of change is usually wrong. It is regrettable and
unjustifiable that an old and beneficial principle of law has been challenged
as no longer a part of American law. Not many will know and few will
care, but some of those who have a keen interest in the Law of Future
Interests will be concerned.
The Restatement of the Law of Property, Vol. III, is about future
interests, and it was published in 1940. 1 The second Restatement of the Law
of Property 2nd, Vol. III, is also about future interests, and it was published
in 1987. 2 The Restatement of the Law of Property 3rd, Vol. III, is also
about future interests, and it was published in 2011.3
Each of the Restatements has a section on the Inter Vivos Branch of the
Worthier Title Doctrine. Restatements I and II both find, in unequivocal
language, that the Inter Vivos Branch of the Worthier Title Doctrine is a
sound and worthwhile principle of law because it furthers the probable
intention of the donor. 4 Restatement III completely reverses those findings
and states that the Inter Vivos Branch of the Worthier Title Doctrine is (a)
not a part of American law and (b) is intent-defeating. 5 The purpose of this
essay is to suggest that neither of the conclusions of Restatement III is
persuasive and to urge courts and legislatures to retain the findings of
Restatement I and II.
The Inter Vivos Branch of the Worthier Title Doctrine has substantial
consequences in 2016. It is not a doctrine in the category referred to by
Justice Holmes when he said, “It is revolting to have no better reason for a
* A.B. 1943, LL.B. 1947, Washburn University; LL.M. 1948, S.J.D. 1955, University
of Michigan; admitted to practice law in Kansas, Oklahoma and Texas; former Chief Judge
of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma; former Vice
President and General Counsel of Shell Oil Company; life member, American Law Institute;
Partner, GableGotwals, Tulsa, Oklahoma.
1. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY (AM. LAW INST. 1940).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS (AM. LAW INST.
1987).
3. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS (AM.
LAW INST. 2001).
4. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 314; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY §
30.2.
5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 16.3.
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rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.” 6 For
example: If Isaac conveys land or personal property to his wife Janet for
life and at her death, to “my heirs at law,” it is not likely that he intends to
invest his prospective heirs or next of kin (whomever they may be) with an
indestructible interest during his lifetime. It seems more probable that he
intends to retain the reversion during his life so that he might dispose of it
while he is alive or by his Will. Application of Restatements I and II
achieve that intent by making the end limitation to Isaac’s “heirs at law”
void and leaving the reversion in him. Application of Restatement III,
however, defeats that intent.
The Inter Vivos Branch of the Worthier Title Doctrine in Restatement II
is framed as follows:
If a person purports to make an inter vivos transfer of an interest
in real property, or of an interest in personal property, to his or
her own heirs or next of kin, such purported transfer is a nullity
in the sense that it designates neither a transferee nor the type of
interest of a transferee, unless additional language or
circumstances indicate the heirs or next of kin are to take as
purchasers or indicate that they are to take as purchasers unless
such person revokes the transfer to them. 7
Restatement II states that this principle of law may be illustrated as
follows:
O transfers Blackacre by deed “to O’s son S for life, then to the
heirs of O.” The rule stated in subsection (1) applies. S has an
estate for life in possession and O has a reversion in fee simple
in the absence of additional language or circumstances that
indicate otherwise. 8
Restatement II states that the above principle of law “is a rule of
construction based on the inference that the average grantor does not intend
by a limitation to his or her own heirs to create in them an interest that is
indestructible by the grantor during the grantor’s own lifetime.” 9 In other
words, the above principle of law is a rule of construction that furthers the
likely intention of the average conveyor.

6.
7.
8.
9.

Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 30.2(1).
Id. § 30.2 cmt. d, illus. 3.
Id. § 30.2 cmt. e.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol68/iss4/2

2016]

THE INTER VIVOS BRANCH

775

I respectfully submit that the purpose of this rule is justified by a
worthwhile intention and ought to be preserved and given effect. I
respectfully disagree with Restatement III, which states that this “doctrine
is intent-defeating” and “has no justification in public policy.” 10
Furthermore, I respectfully submit that the giant academic scholars on
Future Interests for the last seventy years also believed the rule to be
justified. Those giants were the Reporter and members of the Committee of
Advisors that addressed the Inter Vivos Branch of the Worthier Title
Doctrine in Restatements I and II. Restatement I states “[w]here a person
makes a gift in remainder to his own heirs . . . he seldom intends to create
an indestructible interest in those persons who take his property by
intestacy, but intends the same thing as if he had given the remainder ‘to
my estate.’” 11
Consider the identity of some of those giants:
Richard R. Powell, Columbia University, Reporter
W. Barton Leach, Harvard University
A. James Casner, Harvard University, Reporter
Lewis M. Simes, University of Michigan
Charles E. Clark, New Haven, CT
Stanley M. Johanson, University of Texas
Richard V. Wellman, University of Georgia 12
Restatement II, in its Forward, states that
[t]he exposition reflects the skill and sensitivity of the Reporter,
Professor A. James Casner. As in earlier volumes of Donative
Transfers, Professor Casner brings to bear both the highest
technical legal skill and thoughtful awareness of contemporary
social relationships. The Institute acknowledges its continuing
debt to him in the completion of this important work. We also
express our thanks to the members of his Advisory Committee

10. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 16.3 cmt. b.
11. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 314 cmt. a.
12. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY ALI Committee on Property; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROPERTY ALI Officers and Council.
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for their able and conscientious contributions in the drafting
process. 13
I had the good fortune as a graduate student to sit across the table from
Professor Lewis M. Simes and attempt to respond to his piercing and
probing questions. I have also done a bit of work myself on the Worthier
Title Doctrine.14 I have provided my views to the drafters of Restatement
III. 15 I attempted, before the change was made, to direct my attention to
others of my concerns. I wrote a short essay before the final draft was
approved with the hope that my concerns might be addressed. 16
I believe it is fair to say that Restatement III does not address the
reasoning of Restatement I or Restatement II. It does point to the history
and to Justice Cardozo’s decision in Doctor v. Hughes. 17 This decision is
well-known as the leading case on the Inter Vivos Branch of the Worthier
Title Doctrine. Restatement II points out that “Doctor v. Hughes has been
widely followed by courts in jurisdictions other than New York.” 18 Rather
than addressing the rationale of Restatement II or Doctor v. Hughes,
Restatement III simply criticizes Justice Cardozo for finding the doctrine
applicable as a rule of construction, saying that “[s]hifting the worthier-title
doctrine from a rule of law to one of construction is not a normal step in the
evolutionary process of law, and it has done more harm than good.” 19 Thus,
Restatement III simply does not address the substantive reasoning of
Restatements I and II. It also fails to establish that the Worthier Title
Doctrine is no longer recognized as a part of American law. 20
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY Foreword (emphasis added).
14. Joseph W. Morris, The Inter Vivos Branch of the Worthier Title Doctrine, 2 OKLA.
L. REV. 133 (1949); Joseph W. Morris, The Wills Branch of the Worthier Title Doctrine, 54
MICH. L. REV. 451 (1956). The Reporter’s note to Restatement II cites both of these articles.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 30.2, reporter’s nn.3(b), 6(b).
15. When Restatement III was being worked on, I wrote several letters to Professor
Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reporter, University of Michigan Law School and attempted to
bring his attention to my concern about the direction that was being taken by the early drafts.
I did not receive a response until after the decision was made on Restatement III.
16. Joseph W. Morris, The Worthier Title Doctrine: Does Draft Restatement III of
Property Write a Premature Obituary? 45 WASHBURN L.J. 387 (2006).
17. 122 N.E. 221 (N.Y. 1919).
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 30.2, reporter’s n.3(a).
19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
16.3 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2001).
20. The Reporter’s Note to Restatement III identifies eleven states that have abolished
the Doctrine in connection with adopting the Uniform Probate Code and thirteen states that
have done so via non-uniform statutes (i.e., twenty-four states altogether). Id. reporter’s n.2.
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I acknowledge that some state legislatures and some appellate courts
have abolished the Inter Vivos Branch of the Worthier Title Doctrine. Such
a step is appropriate when a judgment is reached by such a body, but there
are many appellate courts and legislatures that have not disavowed or
repudiated the Doctrine. There are many courts that have not yet spoken on
whether the rationale of Restatement I and II is, in fact, more persuasive
than the purported reasons advanced in Restatement III.
In short, I believe it is not justifiable when Restatement III states that
“[t]he doctrine of worthier title is not recognized as a part of American law,
neither as a rule of law, nor as a rule of construction.” 21 Accordingly, I
invite those jurisdictions, which have not legislated or ruled on the viability
of the Worthier Title Doctrine, to look at the twenty-eight pages of
discussion of the Inter Vivos Branch of the Worthier Title Doctrine in
Restatement II and compare that discussion to the six-and-a-half pages of
discussion in Restatement III. 22 Some jurisdictions have embraced the
Doctrine, and some have not. I respectfully urge those jurisdictions that
have not spoken to make the comparison before they decide.

It further identifies two jurisdictions, Connecticut (1947) and the District of Columbia
(1966), where courts have abolished it. Id. But the Note also acknowledges that in the last
fifty years, courts in three states—Mississippi (1980), New Jersey (1964) and Virginia
(1954)—have applied the Doctrine or stated that the rule is still in effect. Id. It further states
that two state legislatures—Kansas and Nebraska—and the courts of three jurisdictions—
Alabama (1978), Iowa (1982) and Kentucky (1940)—have abolished only the testamentary
branch of the Doctrine. Id.
21. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 16.3 cmt. b.
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 30.2; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY
§ 16.3.
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